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Abstract
Literature on convergence among Latin American countries is still scarce compared to other regions.
Almost none of the research connects convergence to the economic history of Latin America and the usual
￿nding is one speed of convergence assuming one globally stable steady-state. In this paper I analyze 32
countries and 108 years, more observations than any other study, which allows me to use chronological events
to explain, analyze and validate the historical convergence clubs in Latin America, assuming multiple steady-
states. The chronological time-line is divided into three important known phases, from which I ￿nd two to
three convergence clubs. Following Thorp (1998), the ￿rst phase, called "the exporting phase" goes from1900
to 1930, the second, "the industrilization phase" from 1931 to 1974, and the last one, "the globalization
phase" from 1975 to 2007. During the last two phases, I ￿nd strong evidence of convergence among those
clubs that succeeded in industrializing and/or building good institutions. The reason may be that technology
di⁄usion and capital accumulation is easier when these two phenomena occur. Furthermore, I ￿nd no evidence
that geographical aspects nor integration processes helped countries to converge.
Introduction
Although economic convergence is not a recent topic, it is crucial in economics and it is still ongoing (Sala-i-
Martin, 2006; Welsh and Bonn, 2008; Hall and Ludwing, 2006, Owen et.al.,2009). It is important for development
economists to ￿nd out if developing countries are catching-up, if the di⁄erences in income across countries tend
to decrease or increase and if there are clubs where countries tend to converge. The detection of income
disparities between economies and clubs of economies can help ￿nding out how to speed-up the process of
economic development.






















Figure 1: GDP per capita dispersion in the World, OECD, Latin America and eight Latin American
countries (LA8). Standard deviation of the logarithm of GDP per capita.
For the case of Latin America, one could expect some sort of convergence since Latin American countries
have few language barriers, similar culture, religion, and common history1. However, preliminary analysis of
the income distribution, measured as the dispersion of the GDP per capita, shows that the dispersion among
Latin American countries has become highly unequal over time, contrary to the OECD countries (see Figure 1).
Nevertheless, when income dispersion is graphed only for the eight Latin American countries (LA8) that have
complete data from 1900 until 2007 (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela),
the pattern of dispersion is reversed, they actually converge (Figure 1). All this suggests that there are di⁄erent
patterns of convergence in Latin America, and, certainly, Latin American countries are not as similar as expected
among all of them but perhaps between some of them.
Previous literature on Latin America is still scarce compared to other clubs of countries and their results are
quite diverse2. Research tends to center on convergence among regions within a given country rather than across
countries3. Almost none of the research relates convergence to the economic history of Latin America4. Usually
one single parameter of speed of convergence is found. In this paper I analyze 32 countries and 108 years, more
observations than any other study5, which allows me to ￿nd more than one speed of convergence according to
the respective club of convergence.
The new growth theory and already known evidence argue against convergence to a unique globally stable
steady-state but rather to several multiple locally stable steady-states (See for example, Quah,1996 and 1997;
1In theory, countries with identical structural characteristics, such as preferences and technologies, are expected to converge
(Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004).
2There are nine studies specialized on the region (discussed in detail further below).
3Studies within a given country are concentrated in few countries, such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Peru.
4The reasons for the lack of studies are the poor availability of data specially at the beginning of the century and that some
studies focus on clubs with speci￿c characteristics such as being part of an integration process or having a speci￿c level of income.
Astorga et.al.(2005) is the only other study where economic history events are introduced.
5Astorga et.al.(2005) analyzed the longest period: 100 years but only six countries while Dobson, Goddard and Ramlogan (2003)
analyzed 24 countries but only 30 years.
2Azariadis and Stachurski, 2005; Durlauf and Johnson, 1995). In oder words, new ￿ndings point towards a natural
club clustering where countries tend to converge. However, economic theory does not guide us on the number
of clubs or the way in which the di⁄erent variables de￿ning initial conditions interact in determining the clubs.
To address this issue, most researchers (e.g. Durlauf and John, 1995; Bai, 1997; Hansen, 2000; Pesaran, 2006;
Paap van Dijk,1998; and Desdoigts, 1998) lean towards the approach of letting the data decide the clubs. They
usually study the shape of the distribution of income per capita and focus on ￿nding an income threshold to
divide clubs. This paper does not follow this approach. Instead, I use historical facts speci￿c to the region to
determine the historical convergence clubs.
The reasons of using historical facts to divide clubs are several. First, I have a long span of data, more
than 100 years, which allows me to look back into history and see the natural clubs of convergence. Second, by
dividing into clubs of similar characteristics I put less demand on the determinants of growth, which are less
available specially at the beginning of the 20th century. Finally, I can analyze the institution hypothesis were
recent literature and evidence has turned to (See for example Easterly (2003); Acemoglu et. al.(2001 and 2002)
, Dollar and Kray (2003), Rodrik et al. 2004)). The argument is that institutions shape economic development,
Easterly (2003) argues that technology is endogenous to the institutions that make adoption of better techniques
of production likely. Therefore, the actions taken by institutions are the ones that shape the way production
functions look like and the way resources are used. Moreover I argue that these actions are shaped by several
factors, such as the resources a country has, the ideological trends, external shocks, and other events which
historians work on capturing. Therefore is important to look at the historical aspects.
Thorp (1998) captures in depth the comparative reality within Latin America and places in a proper historical
context, the development e⁄orts, strategies, choices, successes and failures of the di⁄erent Latin American
countries. She emphasizes on the "political economy" part of the Latin American history, which term is shorthand
for the interface between political forces, institutional inheritance and economic outcomes.
Based on Thorp (1998), I identify three important phases and two to three clubs within each phase6. The
￿rst phase ranges from 1900 until 1930 - when the Great Depression hit the Latin American economies - and it is
characterized by the Latin American countries intensively exporting primary products. Two clubs are identi￿ed:
the mineral and agricultural products exporters. This phase is called exporting phase. During the second
phase, an inward-looking model was the response to the Great Depression. This model is known as Import
Substitution Industrialization (henceforth simply industrialization phase) and goes from 1931 to 1974 when the
oil crisis occurred7. Two clubs are identi￿ed: those that were able to industrialize, despite all the distortions
that the model brought, and the non-industrializers which failed to industrialize for di⁄erent reasons. The
6In fact, the division of periods and groups di⁄ers slightly from Thorp (1998). These di⁄erences are discussed further below.
7Thorp (1998) de￿ned the period: 1945-1973 and called it ￿Industrialization and the growing role of the State￿, since the state
took a greater role in the industrialization process. However, the industrialization process was triggered before, from when the Great
Depression hit the world economy (1930). I discuss this later.
3third phase ranges from 1975 to 2007. This phase is characterized by several features. First, Latin America
experienced the debt crises in the early 80s, to which it responded with several "structural reforms". Then, from
these reforms and from an accumulation of several factors during history, the need for a change in development to
one with a more social outlook in a globalization context arose. I call this phase The globalization phase. Three
clubs are identi￿ed: the good institutions club, where countries developed institutions that could deal with
growth and/or welfare, the painful club, where countries were traumatized by the debt crises adjustment, and
the vulnerable club, composed by the Caribbean countries who are di⁄erent from the rest and are characterized
by being vulnerable to external factors.
After de￿ning the convergence clubs, I use the model setup of Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004), the most
common in the literature to test for convergence. I use single-cross section and panel data regressions with data
from Madisson (2003) combined with the World Bank (2009).
I ￿nd that during the phase of industrialization, and globalization, there is strong evidence of convergence
among those countries that succeeded in industrializing and/or building good institutions. The reason may
be that technology di⁄usion is easier when these phenomena occur, allowing countries that were behind in the
beginning to accumulate capital and catch-up.
I also test for convergence in the most advanced integration processes and geographical regions in Latin
America. Here, convergence fails. The reason is that the integration processes are not yet developed to be able
to reach convergence in real terms and the geographical location is not an issue for convergence.
This paper is laid out as follows. In the ￿rst section, I present a summary of convergence theory and a
review of previous research on Latin America. In Section 2, I describe the methodology and data used to
test convergence. Section 3 presents the most important events of the economic history of Latin America and
describes each of the convergence clubs. In Section 4, I present the results of the speeds of convergence, and
Section 6 discusses di⁄erent issues that may call the validity of the results into question. Finally, I present the
conclusions
1 Theory and Prior Research
Literature on economic growth de￿nes four concepts of convergence. Absolute-￿ or catching-up convergence
when a number of economies converge to one another in the long run, independently of their initial conditions.
Conditional-￿ when per capita incomes of economies that have identical structural characteristics, i.e. pref-
erences, technologies, rates of population growth etc., converge to one another in the long run independently
of their initial conditions. Club is conditional ￿ convergence conditioned on having similar initial conditions.
Finally, ￿-convergence across a club of economies exists if the dispersion of their real per capita GDP tends to
decrease over time (For an extensive discussion of concepts see Galor (1996)).
4The di⁄erent concepts of convergence and their arguments behind have emerged from di⁄erent theories of
economic growth. The neoclassical growth models, such as Solow (1956) predict conditional convergence to
a unique globally stable steady-state based on diminishing returns of capital (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004).
While the endogenous models, like the AK model, predict zero convergence since they do not assume diminishing
returns to capital. However variations in the AK model predict conditional convergence.(Mulligan and Sala-i-
Martin, 1992).
Furthermore, technology di⁄usion models predict convergence based on microfoundations. The main argu-
ment is the existence of lower costs of technology imitation than technology innovation such that followers can
catch-up. Some researchers argue that the technology di⁄usion process goes via foreign investments (Barro and
Sala-i-Martin, 2004), trade (Romer,1990; Aghion and Howitt, 1992), ￿ ows of people (Barnebeck and Dalgaard,
2006) or the type of institutions and geography (Acemoglu et al., 2004). Similarly, theory of integration predicts
convergence based on the idea that common markets will allow countries/regions to catch-up. (Navarro and
Sotelsek, 2001).
Finally, new growth theory, such as models of distribution dynamics, also referred to as polarization, persis-
tent poverty (or poverty traps), strati￿cation, and/or clustering models (Quah,1996; Quah, 1997; Azariadis and
Stachurski, 2005; Durlauf and Johnson, 1995) recognize the possibility of multiple locally-stable steady- states.
The reasons for the existence of di⁄erent converging clubs/clubs may be several, such as the existence of some
threshold level in the endowment of strategic factors of production, nonconvexities or increasing returns, simi-
larities in preferences and technologies, and government policies, which become more similar over time within
certain clubs (Canova, 2004).
In Latin America, there are only nine cross-country studies8 specialized in studying convergence (Blyde,2005
and 2006; Holmes, 2005; Astorga, et.al 2005; Dobson and Ramlogan, 2002a and 2002b; Utrera, 1999; Dabus and
Zinni, 2005; and Madariaga et.al,2003). Although they analyze the same region, they study di⁄erent countries,
periods, and apply di⁄erent methodologies and theories of growth, making it di¢ cult to compare results.
Some of the authors use methodologies that do not measure a speci￿c speed of convergence, such as Blyde
(2006) who studies 21 countries during 1960-2004 and uses a distribution dynamics approach. He ￿nds that
countries are converging to two clubs; one large for low and low middle income countries and another small for
rich income countries9. Also, Dobson, Goddard and Ramoglan (2003) study the case of 24 countries during 1965-
1998 by cross-section analysis and unit root with panel data tests, and ￿nd convergence but not a speci￿c speed.
The problem with these methodologies is that they cannot give an idea of the level of speed of convergence.
Other researchers ￿nd concrete results. For example, Astorga, et.al (2005) study six countries during the
period of 1900-2000. They ￿nd convergence using panel data and error correction models, at a speed between 1%
8The number of studies within a given country is higher than across countries, usually concentrated in few countries as Chile,
Argentina, Brazil and Colombia ( e.g. Marina (2001), Azzoni et al.(2001), Anriquez and Fuentes (2001), Cardenas and Ponton
(1995), Magalhaes, Hewings and Azzoni (2005), Serra et al.(2006)).
9The rich-income countries are Uruguay, Argentina, Chile, and Mexico, and the remaining 17 countries are in the other club.
5and 1.9%, where the oscillation comes from the addition or subtraction of explicative variables that proxy for the
steady-state10. Dobson and Ramlogan (2002a and b) study 19 countries and 28 and 30 years respectively (1970-
1998 and 1960-1990) using cross-section regression and panel data analysis, and ￿nd speeds of convergence
of 0.02% to 2%11. Helliwell (1992) analyzes 18 Latin American countries for the period 1960-1985 and ￿nds
convergence at a speed of 2.5%12.
On the contrary, Dabus and Zinni (2005) analyze 23 countries from 1960 to 1998, and ￿nd absolute and very
high conditional convergence. The authors argue that once controls are introduced and extremely high speeds
of conditional convergence are found, compared to absolute convergence, then it is a signal of divergence. This
is a good point since when controlling by many characteristics, a hypothetical speed of convergence is being
calculated while the real speed of convergence would be absolute convergence. They conclude that convergence
of any type is absent in Latin America. Regarding this, Durlauf and Quah (1999) mention that the choice of
the steady-state proxies depends on the interest of the researcher and that can lead to wrong results.
Almost none of the nine studies relates economic history to convergence. One reason could be the lack of
data in the region, especially at the beginning of the century, most of the papers start their analysis from around
1960, when more detailed data appears. Another reason could be that previous studies did not have the need to
introduce economic history because they grouped few countries as part of a club with a speci￿c characteristic,
like being part of an integration process or having a speci￿c level of income.
2 Methodology and Data
Based on the new growth theory of multiple steady-states, I analyze the di⁄erent patterns of convergence in
Latin America with a historical approach. First, I de￿ne the clubs where convergence is expected according to
historical events and then I test for convergence. In the next section I describe the main characteristics of the
convergence clubs. In this section I explain the methodology to test for convergence.
The model setup follows Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004). The following equation measures the relation for
countries i = 1;:::N during periods t = 1;:::T:
￿it = a ￿
(1 ￿ e￿￿￿it)
￿it
￿ log[y0it] + ui (1)
where ￿it is the average growth rate of period t, a is a constant for all countries and all periods and includes
the common steady-state (useful to measure absolute convergence). In the case that a varies with each country,
ai; it would include the steady-state for each country and speci￿c characteristics (useful to measure conditional
10They include human capital, external, institutional, and economic variables, together with dummy variables related to external
events as the Great Depression and the Debt Crises. The countries are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela.
11Their studies include, as proxies for the steady-state, sectorial decomposition variables, country dummies, population growth,
savings, and human capital.
12He includes variables as investments, population growth, human capital, and scale e⁄ects
6convergence13). Furthermore, y0it is the initial output per capita of period t (measured in logarithms and
instrumented by its lag), ￿ is the speed of convergence if ￿ > 0 (or divergence if ￿ < 0) , ￿it is the total number
of years within period t, and uit is disturbance term with mean zero, ￿nite variance, and independent over t and
i.
Equation(1) is estimated, ￿rst, as a single-cross section regression (t = 1) in order to capture long term
convergence, and then, the analysis is divided into subperiods (t > 1)14, and panel data regressions are used.
Panel data allows using more information by including time variation, which may lead to more robust
results. It also allows adding more variables, like the steady-state, which tests conditional convergence, and time
dummies, which control for external conditions that a⁄ect all countries for speci￿c periods. A drawback of panel
data is that convergence is tested in shorter spans of data which may capture short-term adjustments around
the trend rather than long-term convergence.
The analysis covers 32 countries, listed in Table 1, for the period 1900-2007. The potential number of
observations is 3,456 but due to incomplete data for some countries, the number of real observations is reduced
to 2,209. This is the largest data set used in the literature on convergence in Latin America. The second largest
would be from Astorga et.al. (2005) with 606 observations, 6 countries and 100 years.
13As a matter of fact, the di⁄erent concepts of convergence used here are mixed. Roughly speaking, absolute or catching-up
convergence should only be measured among all countries and all years before making any sort of grouping or adding any controls.
Absolute convergence measured for each period and club can be considered already as conditional convergence since implicit controls
are introduced. Still, inside each group I measure absolute convergence in the sense that no extra explicit controls are included.
Furthermore, when dividing the analysis by groups that vary across time, one refers to club convergence as well.




Starting year Ending year
Argentina 108 0 1900 2007
The Bahamas 28 80 1975 2002
Belize 33 75 1975 2007
Bolivia 63 45 1945 2007
Brazil 108 0 1900 2007
 Barbados 25 83 1975 1999
Chile 108 0 1900 2007
Colombia 108 0 1900 2007
Costa Rica 88 20 1920 2007
Cuba 76 32 1929 2004
Dominica 31 77 1977 2007
Dominican Republic 58 50 1950 2007
Ecuador 69 39 1939 2007
Grenada 28 80 1980 2007
Guatemala 88 20 1920 2007
Guyana 33 75 1975 2007
Honduras 88 20 1920 2007
Haiti 63 45 1945 2007
Jamaica 64 44 1913 2007
St. Kitts and Nevis 31 77 1977 2007
St. Lucia 28 80 1980 2007
Mexico 108 0 1900 2007
Nicaragua 88 20 1920 2007
Panama 63 45 1945 2007
Peru 108 0 1900 2007
Puerto Rico 52 56 1950 2001
Paraguay 69 39 1939 2007
El Salvador 88 20 1920 2007
Trinidad and Tobago 58 50 1950 2007
Uruguay 108 0 1900 2007
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 33 75 1975 2007
Venezuela 108 0 1900 2007
Total 2,209 1,247
Table 1: Description of the data set
The main variable is the GDP per capita measured in constant 1990 International (Geary-Khamis) dollars15.
This measure allows for comparison of standards of living of the countries; it takes into account the purchasing
power parity of currencies and the international prices of commodities. The sources are the Madison Data Base
(0) and the World Bank Data Base (0)16.
15In order to avoid irregular values, I use two year annual averages of the GDP per capita. GDP growth, is calculated as the
geometric annualized average growth of each period.
16The ￿nal data base has information from the Madison database (M) (from 1900 until 1989) and from the World Bank database
(W) (from 1990 to 2007). A converter factor (C) is calculated as: C(1990) = M(1990)=W(1990) for each year and is kept constant
from 1995. Then C is multiplied by the existent W. In the case of ten small Caribbean countries, M has no data, so C is taken
constant, for the year 1995, from another country that heavily in￿uenced these economies and is assumed to have a similar C. The
one from USA is used for The Bahamas; from Great Britain for Barbados and Belize; from Haiti for Dominica St.Kitts and Nevis,
St. Lucia, St.Vincent and the Grenadines; from Colombia for Guyana, and ￿nally from The Dominican Republic for Grenada. In
the case of Cuba, the available GDP from W was measured in constant 2000 local currency. Here, C was calculated with that kind
of data and kept constant for the year 2001. The transformed data go from 2001 to 2007.
83 Historical Background and Convergence Clubs
Studying the development of Latin America for 108 years cannot avoid the study of its history. I divide the data
into convergence clubs, with similar characteristics such that convergence is expected. I merge some clubs from
Thorp (1998) in order to have at most three clubs in each phase. The idea is that each club￿ s main characteristics
matches each phase￿ s description and that clubs di⁄er from each other in a clear way. This section describes the
historical background from where convergence clubs emerge17.
3.1 The Exporting phase (1900-1930)
The ￿rst phase ranges from 1900 until 1930 - the year when the Great Depression whipped Latin American
economies - and it is characterized by countries intensively exporting primary products. In this period, countries
were vulnerable to world income and to ￿ uctuations in primary products prices. I identify two clubs: those
that exported agricultural products and those that exported mineral products18. Agricultural production was
vulnerable to natural disasters and minerals to recessions in the industrialized countries, since minerals were
used in construction, machinery, and chemicals production. While, the mining sector was characterized by using
less land and less labor. It also required more capital and technological investments and had di⁄erent transport
needs than the agricultural sector.
The agricultural club is composed by ten countries: Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, El
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Uruguay. They were producing mainly co⁄ee, bananas, cocoa,
sugar meat and/or wheat19.
The mineral countries number four: Chile, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela. They exported mainly petroleum
and copper20.
3.2 The Industrialization Phase (1931-1974)
Thorp (1998) de￿nes the period from 1945 to 1973 as: ￿Industrialization and the growing role of the State￿ .
However, the industrialization process was triggered before, when the Great depression hit the world economy.
Therefore I expand this phase from 1931, and instead of 1973 as ending year I take 1974, when the oil crises
occurred.
17Table 4 shows the membership of each country to the speci￿c clubs.
18Thorp (1998) organized countries in a more detailed manner, according to their main export product. I merged them in these
2 groups.
19Those producing mainly co⁄ee were Brazil, Colombia, El Salvador and Nicaragua. For Costa Rica and Guatemala, the main
exports were co⁄ee and bananas, while for Honduras it was bananas and precious metals. In general, Central American countries
experienced higher production of bananas after the American multinational company, United Fruit, came to the region (in the
1920s). Cuba produced mainly sugar but also tobacco. Argentina and Uruguay were mainly producing meat and wheat.
20Petroleum was produced by all except Chile, and copper was produced by all except Venezuela. Before 1917, Venezuela was
mainly producing co⁄ee and cacao, but after that year petroleum became the most important source of revenue. Mexico was the
most diversi￿ed export country in Latin America. They also exported lead, zinc, silver, gold, co⁄ee, rubber, and cotton. Mexicans
discovered oil in 1910.
9The Great Depression provoked a fall in economic activity in the industrialized countries, which in turn
reduced their demand for primary products and reversed the capital in￿ ows to Latin America. This situation
deteriorated the terms of trade of all primary products, leading to an increase of the Latin American real import
prices. The natural mechanism would suggest a decrease in real export prices which should have stimulated
the demand again, but due to the extreme circumstances of the Great Depression, the world demand could not
recover. Instead, Latin American demand shifted from imported manufactured goods to domestic manufactured
products, because the former were expensive. This process stimulated the import substitution phase of Latin
America. Therefore, the Great Depression pushed many Latin American countries into a process of import
substitution strategy by default (Cardoso and Helwege, 1992).
The process of industrialization via import substitution was reinforced by the second World War (1939-
1945). Although WWII brought an increase of Latin American exports, there were constraints on their imports.
Consequently, the scarcity of imports and the deterioration of the terms of trade of primary products encouraged
new e⁄orts to substitute imports, but these e⁄orts were limited in turn by scarcity of imported inputs and
capital goods. Additionally, the consensus on the importance of industrialization via import substitution found
theoretical and institutional support in the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA).
The inward looking model consisted of substituting imports, and since imports were characterized by being
highly industrialized, Latin America went into a process of industrialization. Therefore, two clubs emerged in
this period: the industrializers and the non-industrializers21. The industrializers succeeded in creating capital
goods and intermediate input industries, while the non-industrializers remained as primary exporters or created
ine¢ cient industrial sectors that were not able to succeed.
The industrializers are six countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Uruguay. Only these
few countries succeeded in creating capital goods and intermediate input industries, although they had di⁄erent
problems22.
The non-industrializers are the countries that failed to industrialize. In total there are 17 countries:
Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Peru, Venezuela, Paraguay, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Honduras, Do-
minican Republic, Haiti, Panama, Jamaica, Puerto Rico, Trinidad and Tobago, and Cuba. The reasons for these
countries not to industrialize were diverse. Some stayed as primary exporters because of their strong dominating
primary export sector, which in the majority of the cases was overprotected by the government, or because the
21Thorp (1998) had four groups: "strong industrializers", "centrally planned" (Cuba), "primary product export models" and
"export promotion and industralizing by invitation". Thorp mentions that the last two groups should be one group because both
tried to industrialize but failed. The di⁄erence between them is that the ￿rst one had the government to promote the proccess of
industrialization while the second invited foereign capital to do it. Therefore I merge these two groups together with Cuba into the
group of countries that were not able to industrialize.
22Due to their larger domestic markets, Brazil and Mexico managed better than the other countries in the region. Both successfully
created automobile industries. In fact, Brazil experienced the highest growth rates and went through a process of high and persistent
growth rates, during the 60s and 70s, known as the "Brazilian Miracle". E¢ cient steel production was established in Argentina and
Brazil. Chile had political and social structure problems but still promoted the production (and export) of forestry, ￿shing, mining,
and engineering sectors. Colombia industrialized its co⁄ee and was the only country without an overvaluation, in￿ation, or high
levels of debt, but problems of violence during the 40s and 50s a⁄ected the industrialization process. Finally, Uruguay was already
industrialized by 1945 but in mid-1950 they underwent stagnation.
10government created ine¢ cient industrial sectors that were not able to succeed (Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Nicaragua, Peru, Venezuela, Paraguay, and Bolivia). Others were based on di⁄erent models, like Cuba and the
Caribbean countries23.
3.3 The Globalization phase (1975-2007)
The third phase ranges from 1975 to 2007. Due to the oil shock of 1974, Latin American accumulated debt and
did not prevent the coming debt crises, which started in 1979 and 1981, when USA and other OECD countries
kept their money supply tight and increased interest rates radically. Since countries acquired loans at ￿ oating
interest rates, their debt obligations increased vastly. The adjustment left problems that reinforced each other,
like capital out￿ ows, ￿scal de￿cits, in￿ ation, overvaluation, and balance of payment crises.
Countries wanted to stabilize and gain access to foreign credit again, so they applied "structural reforms"
to reach stabilization. These reforms were based on ￿scal orthodoxy, liberalization, and reducing the role of the
state. The IMF suggested to cut budget de￿cits by reducing expenses and increasing taxes, privatize, liberalize
imports and exchange controls (devaluate), eliminate price controls, and increase interest rates. Although
countries sooner or later followed the structural reforms, the results were not as good as expected. The export
sectors of several countries failed to react positively to the exchange rate depreciation. Higher prices of imported
goods reinforced in￿ ation and consequently overvaluation. With higher interest rates it was hard to promote
investments, and due to the tendency of overvaluation and weak export sectors was not possible to promote
exports either. Furthermore, governments had to close factories, resulting in high rates of unemployment and
large informal sectors.
Regarding welfare results, income distributions worsened in all countries outside of the Caribbean, except in
Uruguay and Costa Rica. Poverty, which worsened during the 80s, hardly improved during the 90s. This situation
encouraged rethinking the link between growth and equality. Di⁄erent trends of thought arose around the mid
80s; some supported the idea that good institutions create complementaries between productivity growth and
equality, others that policies that are linked to the political constituency will create a combination of economic
23Venezuela, Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador and Paraguay were not well prepared for industrialization. Bolivia and Paraguay were the
worst cases in terms of results. Bolivia￿ s strong and powerful tin sector took advantage of a weak state to concentrate resources (a
lot of the debt was directed to pay expensive railroads for the sector).. After the revolution in 1952 the tin sector was nationalized
and the government had immense di¢ culties managing it. In the 60s some investments went to the mining and petroleum sectors.
Paraguay was dominated by a few families, protected by the military regime of Stroessner, that were producing the traditional
goods (meat and tobacco), making it hard to change economic structures. Venezuela attempted to industrialize late, and the result
was the creation of an ine¢ cient industrial sector with strong rent seeking characteristics, which brought a lot of distortions. The
Venezuelan economy was highly dependent on its oil, with characteristics of Dutch Disease. Ecuador￿ s protectionism carried out
in the 60s only bene￿ted the traditional elite clubs and failed to industrialize the economy. Peru had good export prospects, so
industrialization through import substitution was low.
El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua concentrated their e⁄orts in the cotton sector, which required moving peasants from
their own lands, making them worse o⁄ (Williams, 1986). All three countries had very low levels of GDP per capita, especially El
Salvador and Honduras. In fact, El Salvador had the lowest GDP per capita of all Latin American countries. Based on a model of
central planning, Cuba tried to diversify their sugar-concentrated economy to corn, rice, cotton, tomatoes, and soybeans, but the
lack of skilled labor and shortages of materials pushed them back to the production of sugar.
The Caribbean countries were under a program of export promotion and industrializing by invitation. Headed by Puerto Rico,
the Caribbean tried to search for di⁄erent markets than sugar. They gave concessions to foreign ￿rms, so they could invest and
industrialize, but employment did not increase, and by the 60s foreign ￿rms left.
11and social development (Thorp,1998).
Following Thorp￿ s line I divide countries during the third phase in three clubs: those that were able to
provide the link between growth and welfare in a globalization context, the "good institutions" club, the ones
that su⁄ered serious consequences of the debt crises, the "painful" club, and the Caribbean countries which are
di⁄erent from the other clubs and are vulnerable to external factors, the "vulnerable" club24.
The club of good institutions is composed by seven countries: Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, Mexico, Colom-
bia, Costa Rica and Brazil. Although some of the countries in this club have had weakened institutions, such as
Argentina, they have managed to reach either acceptable growth rates, good welfare standards, or both25.
The painful club is composed of nine countries: Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Venezuela, Nicaragua, El
Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. This clubs is characterized by having weak institutions that lead to bad
results either in terms of growth, welfare, or both26.
Finally, the vulnerable club includes 16 Caribbean countries: The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Cuba,
Dominica, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Panama, Puerto Rico, St. Kitts and Nevis,
24Thorp (1998) had ￿ve groups that she called: "using the paradigm shift", "reluctant converters", "other radical stabilizers",
"pain without gain", "the Caribbean: greatest vulnerability". I merged the ￿rst two groups into the good institutions group. The
next two were merged into the painful group and the last was kept as the vulnerable group. More details regarding this union, are
in the description of each group.
25On the one hand, Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, and Mexico were able to link economics with welfare in a creative and e⁄ective
way thanks to the prior conditions they met. Although Chile has a high degree of inequality and poverty, they managed to build
strong institutions, and good relations among the public and private sector. The state promoted exports and investments. Even
though they have applied radical orthodox policies and hosted radical violent military regimes, they have built a political consensus
afterwards. They truly committed to the rules of the free market game, gaining investor￿ s con￿dence. Moreover Chile has developed
a process of consultation to identify poorly designed policies.
Argentina and Uruguay had a similar experience to Chile. Both underwent military regimes but Argentina did not learn from this
experience as Chile did, while Uruguay built its political consensus from it. Argentina had a lot of political problems and adopted
both orthodox and heterodox policies (as Mexico). In the 90s it implemented the "convertibility plan", the purpose of which was to
establish strict discipline on the monetary and ￿scal policy. The plan was the keystone for entry into the international system. This
attracted investments, and together with the privatization, the quality of public services improved. Nevertheless, in 2001 Argentina
went into a crisis. The weak ￿scal policy and high ￿scal de￿cits from the provincial governments were re￿ected in an increasing
public debt burden, and the growing overvaluation led to a debt crisis.
Furthermore, Uruguay and Argentina were part of the trade union MERCOSUR , which helped them promote dynamic ￿rms.
Uruguay was the only country to improve welfare indicators during this period and was known by the democratic process of using
popular consultation to approve policies. Mexico could provide the link between economics and welfare, particularly because of its
strong international orientation. Mexico became part of the NAFTA-North American Free Trade Agreement, which involves USA
and Canada.
On the other hand, Brazil, Colombia, and Costa Rica progressed because they had been coherent with their earlier policies.
Colombia, for example, managed to build very strong and quali￿ed institutions that managed the economic issues very well. They
did not borrow too much and they did not have hyperin￿ation. In fact, Thorp (1998) points out that Colombia is the only country
where liberalization coincides with a growing state, re￿ected in the rapid growth of social spending. Nevertheless, corruption and
drugs were serious social problems. Costa Rica is characterized by their democratic values, good relations with the private sector,
and high standards of education. Finally, Brazil, due to its size, was allowed to integrate to the global market in its own way and
its own speed, as everybody wants to have access to Brazil·s big market.
26Bolivia and Peru did not meet the prior conditions that link growth with welfare. They applied orthodox policies and their
structural problems exposed them dramatically to the perils of globalization. Peru had institutional weakness, lack of experience,
and lack of democracy to sustain the reforms. Bolivia spent a lot of time to recover from its hyperin￿ation, which was a hard
process. Moreover, their levels of poverty are still very high.
Ecuador, Paraguay, Venezuela, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras lacked good institutions, had social con￿icts
with guerrilla forces (Guatemala and El Salvador), and problems of contraband and corruption (Paraguay). As an oil country,
Venezuela mismanaged several oil booms, provoking a banking crisis in 1991. Although they liberalized, there was a lack of political
support and proper communication of the reforms, resulting in social resistance. Venezuela, Ecuador, and Paraguay faced strong
opposition in abolishing all protection. After 34 years of a military regime, until 1989, Paraguay could not build an e¢ cient system
of government.
The central American economies were severely a⁄ected by the debt crises (except Costa Rica), because they had a lot of oppression,
corrupted military, and civilian regimes. They tried to undertake market reforms, but due to political fragility they could not succeed.
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Figure 2: GDP per capita dispersion in Latin America. Standard deviation of the logarithm of the smoothen
GDP per capita for all available countries and for the eight countries with most data (LA8). The vertical lines show each
of the three phases.
St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago27.
4 Results
Figure 1 revealed that the distribution of the World income as for Latin America has become increasingly
unequal. On the contrary, the OECD countries have converged among them. Surprisingly, among the LA8
countries with most data, the dispersion has decreased to even lower levels than the OECD countries in 2007.
Nevertheless, when taking a closer look in the region before 1950 (Figure 2), Latin America￿ s high dispersion
during the last phase is also observed at the beginning of the 20th century, during the exporting phase. Certainly
there are di⁄erent patterns of convergence. In this section I discuss the main results of convergence for all clubs
and phases.
Income dispersion of each club and phase is showed in Figure 3 . The only club that shows a clear pattern
of ￿ - divergence is the non-industrializers, and the only one that shows a clear pattern of ￿-convergence is
the industrializers. The agricultural and the mineral clubs, from the ￿rst phase, show a less clear pattern but
still one of convergence. The rest of the clubs, from the third phase, illustrate null convergence being the good
institution club the one with the lowest levels of dispersion and the vulnerable with the highest. The distribution
of income is the most unequal for all Latin American countries during the last phase, showing very high and
27The Caribbean countries were more severely a⁄ected by the adverse trends of the 1970s and 1980s than the rest of Latin
America. While one or two countries could bene￿t by developing ￿nancial services (the Bahamas, for example), most acquired
debt and vulnerability to capital ￿ight and international interest rate changes. These economies are characterized by being too
vulnerable to external shocks. They are quite open and primary products producers. Their agricultural sector performed so poorly
that they are net food importers. Although Cuba is di⁄erent from the other countries, it is still extremely vulnerable to external
factors. When the Soviet Union collapsed, Cuban exports were reduced dramatically. Additionally, Caribbean countries are exposed
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Figure 3: GDP per capita dispersion in Latin America per period and group. Standard deviation of the
logarithm of the smoothen GDP per capita for all periods and groups. The vertical lines show each of the three phases.
persistent levels of dispersion.
The results on ￿-convergence are validated by the replication of other studies to show that my data and
techniques are good enough to expand the data set. First, I replicate the regressions of Astorga et. al. (2005), the
longest period study, 1900-2000, but only for six countries. Then, I replicate the results of Dobson and Ramlogan
(2002b), the study with most countries, 19, but only for 30 years, 1960-1990. The results are satisfactory (see
last lines in Table 3)28. Then, the expanded data set and techniques are consistent with the existing literature
using smaller data sets.
Table 2 shows the results of the speeds of convergence. The ￿rst column display the results of absolute
convergence with single-cross section regression, and the rest show panel data estimations of absolute and
conditional convergence with and without time-e⁄ects (I don￿ t report the coe¢ cients for country nor time-
e⁄ects).
28In Astorga et. al. (2005), their absolute convergence is 1.4%, and mine around 1%. Their conditional convergence is 1.9%
and mine here 2%. In Dobson and Ramlogan (2002b), their absolute convergence is 0.5% and mine 0.3%. Their conditional
convergence is 1.2% and mine 2.8% (my conditional convergence with time e⁄ects is the one used to compare to their highest speeds
of convergence).
14Single cross section
t=1 t>1 Time Effects t>1 Time Effects
All periods β 0.00% 0.21% 0.12% 1.11% 2.31%
1900-2007 se 0.0041 0.0024 0.0031 0.0032 0.0035
N 28 267 267 267 267
t 12
Τ 18,10, 7,7,6,7,7,9,7,7,8,10
8 LA β 0.80% 0.72% 1.05% 0.94% 3.35%
se 0.0037 0.0039 0.0036 0.0061 0.0093
N 8 56 56 56 56
t 7
Τ 15,15,16,15,15,15,17
Phase 1 β 0.81% 0.13% 0.43% -0.47% -3.22%
1900-1930 se 0.0066 0.0057 0.0075 0.1999 0.0629
N 13 21 21 21 21
t 2
Τ 18,10
Agricultural β -0.13% -0.32% -0.39% -0.24% 0.76%
se 0.0027 0.0040 0.0045 0.0825 0.0145
N 9 13 13 13 13
t 2
Τ 20,10
Mineral β 5.22% 0.36% 6.28% -0.52% -5.62%
se 0.1114 0.0171 0.0832 0.2136 0.0565
N 4 8 8 8 8
t 2
Τ 20,11
Phase 2 β -0.02% 0.07% 0.12% 3.72% 4.10%
1931-1974 se 0.0057 0.0039 0.0039 0.0099 0.0129
N 23 120 120 120 120
t 6
Τ 7,7,6,7,7,9
Industrialized β 1.74% 0.97% 1.27% 0.19% -0.23%
se 0.0091 0.0050 0.0034 0.0152 0.0339
N 6 24 24 24 24
t 4
Τ 11,11,11,11
Non-Industriliz β -0.32% -0.19% -0.13% 3.93% 4.26%
se 0.0079 0.0047 0.0045 0.0126 0.0143
N 17 84 84 84 84
t 6
Τ 7,6,6,7,7,9
Phase 3 β 0.56% 0.03% 0.07% 3.48% 3.76%
1975-2007 se 0.0060 0.0037 0.0038 0.0050 0.0088
N 28 126 126 126 126
t 4
Τ 7,7,8,10
Good Institutions β 1.99% 2.06% 1.41% 3.09% 7.08%
se 0.0137 0.0139 0.0187 0.0092 0.0693
N 7 28 28 28 28
t 4
Τ 7,7,8,11
Painfull β 0.47% 0.95% 0.53% 4.44% 3.88%
se 0.0018 0.0032 0.0049 0.0072 0.0092
N 9 27 27 27 27
t 3
Τ 10,10,13
Vulnerable β 0.27% 0.19% 0.13% 3.23% 3.29%
se 0.0075 0.0046 0.0047 0.0089 0.0095
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Table 2: Results. The Table reports the speed of convergence, standard errors, number of observations, number
of periods for the panel data estimations, and the average lenght of each period.
15Results of absolute convergence are robust since under single-cross section and panel data regressions they
coincide in ￿nding either convergence or divergence . The di⁄erence in levels of speeds of convergence is small.
In general, the speeds of convergence under the single-cross section regression are very similar to the panel data
estimations with time-e⁄ects and these ones are higher than the estimations without time-e⁄ects. The models
including time-dummies control for time di⁄erences so that the speed of convergence rises and approaches the
single-cross section results. Both, the single-cross section regression and panel data with time-e⁄ects regression
can be interpreted as long-run convergence concepts because they omit time variation. However, as mentioned
before, the exclusion of time variation is not always desirable. In any case, it seems that the di⁄erence is not an
issue for the absolute convergence case. Inside almost all clubs absolute convergence is present under all methods,
except for the agricultural and non industrialized clubs, where both have negative speeds of convergence but
close to zero.
Regarding conditional convergence, the results are also robust between the models with and without
time-e⁄ects. In general they don￿ t contradict each other regarding convergence or divergence but they di⁄er
more in their rates compared to the absolute convergence results. Conditional convergence including time-e⁄ects
is, in general, higher than without time-e⁄ects, since what is left after controlling for country and time-e⁄ects
is, of course, a very high speed of convergence which could be interpreted as arti￿cial since it gets rid in a
way of time and country variation. For this reason I focus more on the non time-e⁄ects models. All clubs show
conditional convergence (without time-e⁄ects) except the agricultural and the mineral clubs, with negative speeds
of convergence but close to zero. Conditional convergence tends to be higher than absolute convergence. The
explanation is that countries converge faster after their steady-state and country speci￿c e⁄ects are controlled
for.
During the ￿rst phase, countries converge in an absolute way (1%) but diverge in a conditional (-0.5%), and
￿-converge in overall. After controlling for each country speci￿c characteristic including the steady-state, and
time variation, countries diverge. This could imply that their observed absolute convergence is due to common
factors determined by the international markets and their demand for Latin American products, rather than
the speci￿c country characteristics. One can also say that there is long-run convergence rather than short-run
convergence.
In the same way, the mineral countries converge in an absolute way (6%), diverge in a conditional (-0.5%),
and ￿-convergence in overall. One crucial common factor for the mineral countries to converge in an absolute way
is the WWI (1914-1918). The WWI accelerated the shift in trade and investment structures in Latin America,
specially for the mineral sector. The demand for Latin American minerals increased together with investment
in the mineral sectors. According to Furtado (1981) the war stimulated the industrial growth in Latin America.
On the contrary, the agricultural countries diverge in the long run and short run (without time-e⁄ects).
Furthermore, Figure 3 shows that the agricultural club have high levels of dispersion, which stay constant
16for around the ￿rst 20 years, and then decrease in levels. This overall divergence may be due to the lack of
accumulation of capital and technology investment that characterizes the agricultural sector, compared, for
example, to the mineral sector. Besides the agricultural countries are more heterogenous than the mineral, they
were producing more di⁄erent goods, which can explain the lack of convergence together with the fact that the
WWII bene￿ted mostly the mineral sector.
During the second phase of industrialization, countries show an absolute convergence rate close to zero but
a conditional of around 4% (with and without time-e⁄ects), and income dispersion increased. The reason for the
lack of absolute convergence and the presence of conditional convergence may be that during this phase, countries
went on their own way of development by industrializing or not, such that each country￿ s own experience was
more important in determining convergence than the external common factors that had been important during
the frist phase. Therefore, once country speci￿c characteristics (and time-e⁄ects) are controlled for, countries
converge.
With or without controlling for country speci￿c characteristics, the industrializers do not diverge. Their
absolute speed is around 1% , conditional 0.2% (without time-e⁄ects), and a very strong pattern of ￿-convergence.
The reason for their non divergence could be the industrialization process. They were able to succeed, despite
all the distortions that the industrialization via import substitution brought, in innovating some industries and
creating capital such that technology transmission was more ￿ uent, even though countries went on in their own
way and had big di⁄erences among them.
On the contrary, the non-industrializers diverge in an absolute way (at speeds below -1%), converge only
after controlling for country and time speci￿c e⁄ects, at a speed of around 4%, and there is a clear ￿-divergence
pattern. This implies that they diverge between them but each country converge to their own steady-state.
There was a lack of a common factor that allowed them to converge like in other cases. Each country went in
their own way diverging from each other. Instead of industrializing by producing capital goods and creating
intermediate input industries, some stayed as primary exporters.
Lastly, during the third phase, countries converge in an absolute and conditional sense but at very di⁄erent
speeds. Their absolute convergence is less than 1% and conditional around 3.5%, meaning that common external
factors were determining the path, like the debt crises, but also that each country￿ s own experience was important
for convergence, such as the link between globalization and welfare that each country provided. Regarding income
dispersion, it has been constant but at rather high levels.
The good institution club could develop a connection between globalization and welfare by having ac-
ceptable welfare standards of living, good relations between the public and private sector, democratic values,
and integration to the global markets among others. All of this characteristics are certainly helpful for capital
accumulation and technology di⁄usion. Therefore, the results show absolute and conditional convergence. Both
are close to each other, around 2%, which is a sign of strong convergence. As for the total phase, the income
17dispersion is constant but at very low levels.
The painful club is characterized by having had weak institutions that lead to bad results either in terms
of growth, welfare, or both, which most likely did not motivate technology di⁄usion nor capital accumulation.
Nonetheless I ￿nd convergence by all means but at verydi⁄erent rates. Their absolute convergence is around
0.6% and their conditional is around 4%. This implies that they vaguely converge between them but each
converge to their own steady-state. Their income dispersion is constant.
In a similar way, the vulnerable club, composed by the Caribbean countries which were more severely
a⁄ected by the adverse trends of the 1970s and 1980s than the rest of Latin America, converge vaguely(around
zero) in an absolute, strongly in a conditional way (around 3%), and a constant rather high income dispersion
compared to the other clubs of this phase. The absolute non-convergence shows no common convergence factors
stronger than their own experience.
From all the clubs, two showed more similar speeds of absolute and conditional convergence than the others:
the industrializers and the good institutions29. Both clubs are composed by almost the same countries, namely
six: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Uruguay, which are all included in the LA8 group. Therefore,
the observed strong ￿-convergence found among the LA8 is due to the presence of these six countries (LA6).
The speeds of convergence for the six countries for the whole period are shown in Table 3. All types of
convergence are found, and the absolute and conditional convergence are quite similar, around 1%. Notice that
the speeds of convergence are lower than in the 8LA. The reason is that 8LA includes Venezuela that bene￿ted
from the oil to catch-up to the others30.
5 Discussion
In this section I discuss the controversial points of this paper, such as the validity of the grouping and econometric
issues like endogenity problems, and unbalanced panel data issues.
Validity of the grouping
The validity of the division of clubs based on economic history can be questioned. The idea of organizing countries
into clubs is not new and have been addressed by several authors, like for example Durlauf and Johnson (1995),
Hansen (2000) Pesaran, H (2006). Most researchers study the shape of the distribution of income per capita
and ￿nd an income threshold to divide convergence clubs. This paper let historical facts to decide the natural
groupings instead of letting the data do it. However there may be other ways than the historical approach and
29In order to compare speeds I take into account only panel data estimators. For absolute convergence I consider the one with
time-e⁄ects, since is closer to the single cross sections regression-the long run convergence, and for conditional convergence, I take
the one without time-e⁄ects, because as seen before, the concept with time-e⁄ect does not take into account the time variation
which actually interests us.
30Note as well that four out of the six countries are included in the list of the rich club found by Blydes (2006). The author found
this club because of their level of income but did not explain the forces, events, or background behind his ￿ndings.
18in this section I try di⁄erent ways of grouping.
I cluster countries according to their membership to an integration process. In the region, the most advanced
economic integration processes are 4 custom unions: the MCCA (Mercado Comœn Centroamericano-Central
American Common Market), CAN (Comunidad Andina-Andean Community), CARICOM (Caribbean Commu-
nity) and MERCOSUR. (Mercado Comœn del Sur - Southern Common Market)31.
Inside all unions there is a clear pattern of sigma divergence except for CARICOM (See Fig.4). Regarding
absolute convergence (Table 3), there is null convergence for CARICOM, and there is divergence for the rest of
the unions (at least under the single-cross section). Regarding conditional convergence, it is found in all unions
with or without time-e⁄ects, except for MERCOSUR which shows conditional divergence without time-e⁄ects.
Overall, the results of absolute and sigma divergence validate what was expected, that there is a low degree of
integration in the region in order to reach absolute output convergence32.
31MCCA was created in 1960, and it is composed by ￿ve countries: Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa
Rica. CAN was installed in1969, and nowadays has four members: Bolivia, Ecuador, Colombia, and Peru. Chile and Venezuela
were members as well, but Chile withdrew in 1976 and Venezuela in 2006. CARICOM was created in 1975, and includes: Antigua
and Barbuda*, The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat*, Saint Lucia, St. Kitts
and Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname*, and Trinidad and Tobago (* indicates the countries are excluded from the
analysis due to lack of data). MERCOSUR was founded in 1986 and currently has ￿ve members: Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay,
Venezuela and Uruguay.
32Holmes (2005) and Madariaga et.al.(2003) found convergence for the MCCA and the MERCOSUR unions, which results can
be compared to the conditional convergence results in this paper. Blyde (2005) found increasing dispersion in MERCOSUR, which
can be compared to the ￿-divergence here.
19Single cross section
t=1 t>1 Time Effects t>1 Time Effects
1975-2007 CARICOM β 0.09% 0.23% 0.21% 4.93% 4.56%
se 0.0095 0.0047 0.0047 0.0115 0.0091
N 10 47 47 47 47
t 4
Τ 7,8,8,8
1960-2007 MCCA β -1.09% -0.10% -1.19% 4.36% 0.57%
se 0.0088 0.0082 0.0051 0.0156 0.0099
N 5 30 30 30 30
t 6
Τ 8,8,8,8,8,8
1969-2007 CAN β -0.17% 0.60% 0.38% 1.76% 6.13%
se 0.0161 0.0076 0.0102 0.0182 0.0291
N 4 20 20 20 20
t 5
Τ 8,8,8,8,7
1986-2007 MERCOSUR β -1.70% -2.50% -1.90% -4.90% 4.12%
se 0.0011 0.0063 0.0028 0.0046 0.1508




6 LA β 0.73% 0.20% 0.66% 0.04% 1.46%
se 0.0020 0.0019 0.0018 0.0019 0.0097
N 6 42 42 42 42
t 7
Τ 15,15,16,15,15,15,17
β 1.15% 0.47% 0.85% 0.56% 2.28%
Astorga et.al. (2005) se 0.0047 0.0032 0.0028 0.0049 0.0060
N 6 60 60 60 60
t 10
Τ 10x10
Dobson et.al.(2002) β 0.39% 0.31% 0.00% 4.25% 3.04%
se 0.0043 0.0026 0.0028 0.0081 0.0184







Table 3: Results. The Table reports the speed of convergence, standard errors, number of observations, number
of periods for the panel data estimations, and the average lenght of each period.
Another interpretation of these clustering is that the custom unions are also showing grouping by geography.
The MCCA clubs all countries from Central America, CAN countries from the Andean region, CARICOM the
Caribbean countries and MERCOSUR the southern cone countries. Therefore, it seems that geography does
not determine convergence either.
Grouping by economic history is the preferred choice. It makes sense that economic processes that change in
time according to policies, external shocks, and regional trends draw di⁄erent patterns of convergence. Regarding
the success of the grouping, only two clubs, the agricultural and the non-industrializers, showed non convergence
20under at least two concepts.
Econometric Issues
The results presented here could be biased and inconsistent if there were endogeneity problems. There are
three potential sources of endogeneity: Omitted variables, measurement error and/or simultaneity (Wooldridge,
2002). Regarding omitted variables, it may not be convincing not to have other explicit variables in the growth
equations than the initial output33, country-speci￿c characteristics, including the steady-state, and the time-
e⁄ects. However, I have introduced implicit controls when dividing the countries into periods and clubs. These
variables are external shocks, sector dummies, export product characteristics, degree of industrialization, and
institutions information. Having in mind both the implicit and explicit variables, the omitted variable problem
can be undermined.
Measurement errors in the GDP per capita at the beginning of each period (the explicit regressor that could
show some sort of measurement error) can be present due to poor calculations and they may be temporary. This
problem is diminished by smoothing the data such that the temporal errors tend to disappear.
Finally, simultaneity in the case of single-cross section regression (contemporaneous) is not possible because
the average growth rate of a period of 30 years, for instance, cannot determine the initial conditions of that
period, unless the growth rate of the period was expected 30 years before, which is not likely. Remember that
the initial conditions are understood as the explicit and implicit explanatory variables. Similary, simultaneity
(sequential) in panel data is absent. The average growth rate of a period of 30 years, for example, cannot
determine the initial conditions of the same period, as explained above, or the initial conditions of past periods
but it can determine the initial condition of the next period. Therefore, panel data estimations are appropriate
as well.
Another topic is unbalanced panel data, some countries do not have information, specially for the ￿rst years.
This can be a problem if the reason for missing information is related to the error term, but since the reason is
connected to the regressor, our panel data estimators are valid. It is clear that the reason for the lack of data
is due to the development of each country. At the beginning of the century, only strong economies had data.
Therefore, missing information is due to low levels of GDP at the beginning of each period.
Conclusions
This paper, based on Thorp (1998), analyzes the most important and known historical facts of 32 Latin American
countries over more than a century (1900-2007), from where di⁄erent phases and several convergence clubs are
identi￿ed. I use the model setup from Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004), which is the most used in the literature
33Actually, the initial output of a period has a strong explanatory power on the average growth in general. Barro and Sala-i-Martin
(2004) make a BACE analysis where the intial output is strongly related to growth.
21and reaches concrete results about convergence. Then, with data from Madisson (2003) and the World Bank
(2009), I use single-cross section and panel data regressions to estimate the speeds of convergence for each phase
and convergence club. In this way, by grouping countries with similar characteristics, I avoid using arbitrary
determinants of growth, I solve the problem of lack of data at the beginning of the century, and I expand the
usual range of data analyzed so far.
During the ￿rst phase, from 1900 to 1930, since Latin American countries development was focused on
primary product exports, two clubs were identi￿ed: the mineral and agricultural products exporters. Throughout
the period and for the mineral countries, there is absolute but not conditional convergence, and a degree of ￿-
convergence. This suggests that their convergence is determined by common factors as the international markets
and the demand for Latin American products, rather than by speci￿c country characteristics. For the mineral
club, the WWI is crucial since it increased their exports and investments on their sector. On the contrary, the
agricultural countries converged only after controlling for speci￿c country characteristics, which suggests that
there was not enough capital accumulation nor technology di⁄usion to ease the convergence process.
Throughout the second phase, from 1931 to 1974, when countries followed a model of import substitution
by industrialization, two clubs are identi￿ed: those that were able to industrialize and the non-industrializers
which failed to industrialize for di⁄erent reasons. During the entire period and for the non industrializers there
is strong conditional convergence compared to absolute and ￿-convergence. Each country speci￿c characteristic
is more important for convergence than the common factors. For the industrializers club there is absolute,
conditional, and ￿-convergence. This suggests that the process of industrialization, despite the distortions,
brought innovation and capital which eased the process of convergence.
During the third phase, from 1975 to 2007, after the arise of a more social concern of development and a
willingness to participate in the globalization process, three clubs are identi￿ed: good institutions countries,
which developed institutions that could deal with growth and/or welfare, painful processes countries, which
were traumatized by the debt crises adjustment, and vulnerable countries, the Caribbean, which are di⁄erent
from the rest and are characterized by being vulnerable to external factors. Throughout the whole period and
for all clubs there is absolute, conditional, and constant ￿-convergence. However, the only club with similar
rates of absolute and conditional convergence and with low levels of dispersion is the good institution club.
This robust convergence among the good institution countries show that their ability to develop a connection
between globalization and welfare helped for capital accumulation and technology di⁄usion, the main forces
behind convergence.
Overall, two clubs show strong evidence of convergence under all concepts. Their speed of ￿-convergence is
around 2%. Countries in these clubs were able to succeed in industrializing and/or building good institutions.
Therefore, as long as countries follow appropriate policies on physical and human capital accumulation, the
di⁄erence between countries in Latin America will slowly disappear over time, as it did between some countries
22already.
The idea of having convergence clubs from a historical approach is new and can be controversial. Despite that
it makes sense that economic processes that change in time according to policies, external shocks, and regional
trends draw di⁄erent patterns of convergence, there are other ways of ￿nding convergence clubs. I analyzed two
other alternatives, by integration agreements and geographical vicinity and found no evidence for convergence.
The other possibility is to analyze the income distribution and ￿nd thresholds that divide clubs. However the
idea from this paper is to have di⁄erent clubs based upon prior knowledge of the shared history and not based
on post information of income. In anyway, the correct way of dividing the clubs is unknown, so the validity of
the grouping by history or other way can be easily questioned.
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Figure 4: GDP per capita dispersion in Latin America per custom union. Standard deviation of the
logarithm of the smoothen GDP per custom union.
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